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Abstract—This paper considers secret-key generation between
several agents and a base station that observe independent
and identically distributed realizations of correlated random
variables. Each agent wishes to generate the longest possible
individual key with the base station by means of public commu-
nication. All keys must be jointly kept secret from all external
entities. In this many-to-one secret-key generation setting, it can
be shown that the agents can take advantage of a collective
protocol to increase the sum-rate of their generated keys.
However, when each agent is only interested in maximizing its
own secret-key rate, agents may be unwilling to participate
in a collective protocol. Furthermore, when such a collective
protocol is employed, how to fairly allocate individual key rates
arises as a valid issue. This paper studies this tension between
cooperation and self-interest with a game-theoretic treatment.
The work establishes that cooperation is in the best interest of
all individualistic agents and that there exists individual secret-
key rate allocations that incentivize the agents to follow the
protocol. Additionally, an explicit coding scheme that achieves
such allocations is proposed.
Index Terms—Multiterminal secret-key generation, strong se-
crecy, coalitional game theory, hash functions, polar codes
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiterminal communication settings subject to limited
total resources bring about issues pertaining to competition,
and fairness among users. Such issues are typically studied
by means of game theory; see, for instance, references [2]–
[4] which deal with the Gaussian multiple access channel,
and [5]–[10] which deal with interference channels.
In this paper, we study a multiterminal secret-key generation
problem that involves selfish users, and propose to study the
tension between cooperation and selfishness by means of coop-
erative game theory, more specifically, coalitional game theory.
We refer to [11]–[13] for an introduction to coalitional game
theory, and to [14] for a review of some of its applications to
telecommunications. Our setting can be explained as follows.
Each agent wishes to generate an individual key of maximal
length with the base station to securely and individually report
information, using a one-time pad for instance. There are
many such agents and a single base station. The generated
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keys must be jointly kept secret from all external entities. We
consider a source model for secret-key generation [15], [16],
i.e., the agents and the base station observe independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) realizations of correlated random
variables (possibly obtained, after appropriate manipulations,
from channel gains measurements [17]–[20]), and can com-
municate over an authenticated public noiseless channel. It can
be shown that when agents are altruistic, the agents increase
the sum of their key lengths by agreeing to participate in a
joint protocol, in contrast to operating separately on their own.
However, when each agent is interested in maximizing its own
key length only, as we consider, there exists a tension between
cooperation and the sole interest of a given agent. Moreover,
assuming that the agents collaborate to maximize the sum of
their key lengths, another issue is to determine a fair allocation
of individual key lengths, so that no agent has any incentive
to deviate from the protocol. The goal of our study is to study
this tension between cooperation and selfishness.
Note that when the agents are assumed to be altruistic, and
when fairness issues are ignored, the secret-key generation
model we consider reduces to the one studied in [21] and is
related to multiple-key generation in a network with trusted
helpers [22]–[24]. Note also that once the secret-key genera-
tion protocol is done, the subsequent transmission to the base
station of messages protected by means of a one-time pad with
the generated secret keys can be viewed as a noiseless multiple
access wiretap channel [25].
Our contributions are three-fold. (i) We formally intro-
duce an integrated game-theoretic and information-theoretic
formulation of the problem in Section II. Specifically, we
cast the problem as a coalitional game in which the value
function is determined under information-theoretic guarantees,
i.e., the value associated with a coalition is computed with no
restrictions on the strategies that the users outside the coalition
could adopt. We then derive properties of the defined game
and propose rate allocations as candidates for fair solutions in
Section III. (ii) By adding the constraint that the agents are
selfish, we derive a converse using the core of the game we
define, which differs from the techniques used for a setting
that does not involve selfihness constraints [21], [23]. (iii)
We provide in Section IV an explicit coding scheme based
on polar codes for source coding [26] and hash functions to
implement the solutions proposed in Section III. Note that a
few explicit coding schemes have been proposed for multi-
terminal secret-key generation problems [27]–[29], however,
the coding schemes in these references do not seem to easily
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
04
64
3v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
4 A
pr
 20
19
2K2
X2NAgent 2
 \left( \begin{array}{ccc}
\widehat{K}_1  \\
\widehat{K}_2\\
\vdots  \\
\widehat{K}_L  \end{array} \right)
K1
X1NAgent 1
ENC/DEC
KL
XLNAgent L
ENC/DEC
X0N
ENC/DEC
Base Station
ENC/DEC Public
communication
over a noiseless
authenticated
channel Kˆl( )1≤l≤L
Fig. 1. Many-to-one secret-key generation setting.
apply to our setting. Specifically, the distributed nature of our
setting is challenging as each agent must locally generate a
key without the knowledge of the source observations of the
other agents, and all the generated keys must be collectively
secure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
formally state the problem in Section II. We study in Sec-
tion III the game we have defined in Section II. We propose an
explicit coding scheme to achieve any point in the core of our
game in Section IV. We study our model in the case of non-
degraded sources in Section V. We generalize our model to a
setting with multiple clearance levels in Section VI. Finally,
we provide concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We define an auxiliary secret-key generation model with no
selfishness constraints in Section II-A, and provide additional
definitions in Section II-B. In Section II-C, we explain our
objective using the model of Section II-A to which selfish-
ness constraints are added, and describe the integrated game-
theoretic and information-theoretic problem formulation.
Notation: For any a ∈ N∗, define J1, aK , [1, a] ∩ N. For
a given set S, we let 2S denote the power set of S. For
two probability distributions p and q defined over the same
alphabet X , we define the variational distance between p and
q as V(p, q) ,
∑
x∈X |p(x) − q(x)|. Finally,× denotes the
Cartesian product.
A. An auxiliary secret-key generation model (without selfish-
ness constraints)
Let L ∈ N∗ and L , J1, LK. In the following, we consider
L agents represented by the set L and one base station.
1) Definition of the source model: Define XL as the Carte-
sian product of L finite alphabets Xl, l ∈ L. Consider a
discrete memoryless source (DMS) (XL ×X0, pXLX0), where
X0 is a finite alphabet and XL , (Xl)l∈L. For l ∈ L, Agent l
observes the component Xl of the DMS, and the base station
observes the component X0. The source is assumed to follow
the following Markov chain: for any S, T ⊂ L such that
S ∩ T = ∅,
XS −X0 −XT . (1)
Note that such a source model has already been considered
in [28]–[30]. Assuming that all the random variables are
binary, an instance of this model is Xl , X0 ⊕ Bl, ∀l ∈ L,
where the Bl’s are independent Bernoulli random variables
and ⊕ is the modulo-two addition.
The source’s statistics are assumed known to all parties,
and communication is allowed over an authenticated noiseless
public channel.
2) Description of the objectives for the agents: The goal
of Agent l ∈ L is to generate an individual secret-key with
the base station. We formalize the definition of a secret-
key generation protocol for this setting, which is depicted in
Figure 1.
Definition 1. For l ∈ L, let Kl be a key alphabet of size
2NRl and define KL as the Cartesian product×l∈LKl. A
((2NRl)l∈L, N) secret-key generation strategy for the agents
in L is as follows.
1) The base station observes XN0 and Agent l, l ∈ L,
observes XNl .
2) The agents in L and the base station communicate,
possibly interactively, over the public channel. The global
public communication between the agents in L and the
base station is denoted by A ∈ A, for some discrete
alphabet A.
3) Agent l, l ∈ L, computes Kl(XNl , A) ∈ Kl.
4) The base station computes K̂l(XN0 , A) ∈ Kl, l ∈ L.
In the following, we use the notation KL , (Kl)l∈L.
Definition 2. A secret-key rate tuple (Rl)l∈L is achievable if
there exists a sequence of ((2NRl)l∈L, N) secret-key genera-
tion strategies for the agents in L such that
lim
N→∞
P[K̂L 6= KL] = 0 (Reliability), (2)
lim
N→∞
I (KL;A) = 0 (Collective Secrecy), (3)
lim
N→∞
log|KL|−H(KL) = 0 (Keys Uniformity). (4)
The secrecy constraint (3) ensures that the keys generated
by the agents in L are independent from the public commu-
nication. Note, however, that (3) does not mean that the key
of a particular agent in L is secret from the other agents.
Moreover, (4) ensures that the keys generated are almost
jointly independent, so that the simultaneous use of the keys
by the agents in L is secure. Note that this setting has been
introduced in [21].
Observe that in the presented setting we implicitly assumed
that the agents in L are willing to agree on a common secret
key generation protocol. In Section II-C, we study a similar
setting but with the additional constraint that the agents are
selfish. Before we move to this setting we introduce additional
definitions in Section II-B.
3B. Additional definitions
We provide additional definitions that will be useful to
incorporate selfishness constraints in the model presented in
Section II-A. These definitions generalize the setting described
in Section II-A when security constraints with respect to a
subset of agents hold, i.e., the keys generated by a given subset
of agents are required to be secret from the rest of the agents.
We formalize the definition of a secret-key generation protocol
for a group of agents S ⊆ L in the following definitions.
Definition 3. Let S ⊆ L. For i ∈ S, let Ki be a key alphabet
of size 2NRi and define KS =×i∈S Ki. A ((2NRi)i∈S , N)
secret-key generation strategy for the coalition of agents S is
as follows.
1) The base station observes XN0 and Agent i, i ∈ S ,
observes XNi .
2) The agents in S and the base station communicate,
possibly interactively, over the public channel. The global
public communication between the agents in S and the
base station is denoted by AS ∈ AS , for some discrete
alphabet AS .
3) Agent i, i ∈ S, computes Ki(XNi , AS) ∈ Ki.
4) The base station computes K̂i(XN0 , AS) ∈ Ki, i ∈ S.
In the following, we use the notation KS , (Ki)i∈S .
Definition 4. Let S ⊆ L. A secret-key rate tuple (Ri)i∈S is
achievable if there exists a sequence of ((2NRi)i∈S , N) secret-
key generation strategies for the coalition of agents S such
that
lim
N→∞
P[K̂S 6= KS ] = 0 (Reliability), (5)
lim
N→∞
I
(
KS ;AS , XNL\S
)
= 0 (Collective Secrecy), (6)
lim
N→∞
log|KS |−H(KS) = 0 (Key Uniformity). (7)
The secrecy constraint (6) with respect to the agents outside
of S means that the agents in S follow a protocol for secret-
key generation under the information-theoretic constraint that
the agent in L\S are not assumed to follow any specific
communication strategy. Note that choosing S = L recovers
the setting of Section II-A.
Remark 1. (6) and (7) can be combined in only one condition.
If
lim
N→∞
NV
(
pKSASXNL\S
, pUSpASXNL\S
)
= 0, (8)
then (6) and (7) hold by [31, Lemma 1], [32, Lemma 2.7],
where pUS denotes the uniform distribution over KS .
C. Secret-key generation with selfish users
We consider the secret-key generation problem described
by Definitions 1 and 2 when the agents are selfish, i.e.,
they are solely interested in maximizing their own secret-key
rate. The agents can potentially form coalitions to achieve
this goal, in the sense that subsets of agents can agree
on a collective protocol to follow before the actual secret-
key generation protocol occurs. Note that the model allows
the agents to communicate with each other over the public
channel and determine whether or not they want to be part
of a coalition. However, we do not assume any privilege for
coalitions, in particular, if the members of a given coalition
need to communicate with each other, they only have access
to the aforementioned public communication channel. In the
following, cooperation among a set of agents S ⊆ L means
that the agents in S agree on participating in a secret key
generation scheme as defined in Definition 3.
The questions we are interested in are the following. (i) Can
selfish agents find a consensus about which coalitions to form?
(ii) If such consensus exists, how should the value, i.e., the
secret-key sum-rate, of each coalition be allocated among its
agents?
We define a game corresponding to this problem as follows.
For S ⊆ L, let S(S) be the set of all sequences (SN (S))N∈N,
where SN (S) is a ((2NRi)i∈S , N) secret-key generation strat-
egy as defined in Definition 3. The set of strategies that
coalition S ⊆ L can adopt is S(S). Consider a sequence of
payoff functions (pil)l∈L, where for l ∈ L, pil(aL) represents
the payoff of agent l, i.e., the rate of its secret key, when
the strategies aL ∈
⋃
P∈P
(×S∈P S(S)) are played by the
agents, where P denotes the set of all partitions of L. We
assume a decentralized setting in the sense that the base station
does not influence the strategies of the agents, i.e., is not a
player but a passive entity.
Remark 2. Our study aims at modeling selfish constraints for
the agents, and how they can be accounted in a decentralized
manner without an external authority entity. However, consid-
ering an active base station that could force coalition-building
is an interesting avenue for future research.
We next wish to formulate a coalitional game by associating
with each coalition of cooperating agents S ⊆ L a certain
worth v(S). As detailed in Section III, such mapping v
provides with a tool to study the stability of coalitions formed
by the agents, where stability of a coalition means that there
is no incentive to merge with another coalition or to split into
smaller coalitions. Two potential choices for the worth v(S)
of coalition S ⊆ L are the following, [33], [34]
max
aS
∈S(S)
min
aL\S
∈S(L\S)
∑
i∈S
pii(aS , aL\S), (9)
min
aL\S
∈S(L\S)
max
aS
∈S(S)
∑
i∈S
pii(aS , aL\S), (10)
where the quantity in (9) corresponds to the payoff that
coalition S can ensure to its members regardless of the
strategies adopted by the member of L\S, and the one in (10)
to the payoff that coalition L\S cannot prevent coalition S
to receive. See, for instance, [35] for a detailed explanation
of the subtle difference between these two notions in general.
Observe also that for our problem both quantities are equal
since for any S ⊆ L, there exists a∗L\S ∈ S(L\S) such that
for any strategies aS ∈ S(S), we have∑
i∈S
pii(aS , aL\S) >
∑
i∈S
pii(aS , a∗L\S). (11)
Indeed, consider a∗L\S as the strategies consisting in publicly
4disclosing XNi for all agents i ∈ L\S.
To summarize, for a DMS (XL ×X0, pXLX0), the secret-
key generation problem described in Definitions 1, 2, when the
agents are selfish is cast as a coalitional games (L, v) where
the value function is defined as
v : 2L → R+,S 7→ max
aS
∈S(S)
min
aL\S
∈S(L\S)
∑
i∈S
pii(aS , aL\S) (12)
such that for any S ⊆ L, v(S) corresponds to the maximal
secret-key sum-rate achievable by coalition S when no specific
strategy is assumed for the agents in L\S.
III. GAME ANALYSIS
For any S ⊆ L, we define the complement of S as
Sc , L\S. In Section III-A, we study the properties of the
game defined in Section II-C and, in Section III-B, we propose
candidates for the secret-key rate allocation.
A. Properties of the game and characterization of its core
We first provide the following characterization of the value
function v defined in (12).
Theorem 1. We have for any coalition S ⊆ L
max
aS
∈S(S)
min
aSc
∈S(Sc)
∑
i∈S
pii(aS , aSc) = I (XS ;X0|XSc) . (13)
Hence, for any S ⊆ L
v(S) = I (XS ;X0|XSc) . (14)
Proof. Consider the secret-key generation problem described
in Definitions 3 and 4. v(S) corresponds to the secret-key sum-
rate capacity CS for coalition S ⊆ L, i.e., the maximal secret-
key sum-rate
∑
i∈S Ri achievable by coalition S. Moreover,
we have
CS = I (XS ;X0|XSc) . (15)
The converse proof for (15) follows from [15], [16] by consid-
ering two legitimate users, each observing XNS and X
N
0 , one
Eavesdropper, observing XNSc , and by the Markov chain (1).
The achievability part is more involved and will later follow
from Corollary 2 derived in Section IV. We intentionally
postpone its proof to streamline presentation. 
We now review the notion of superadditivity.
Definition 5. A game (L, v) is superadditive if v : 2L → R+
is such that
∀S, T ⊆ L,S ∩ T = ∅ =⇒ v(S) + v(T ) 6 v(S ∪ T ).
(16)
Property 1. The game (L, v) defined in (12) is superadditive.
Proof. Let S, T ⊆ L, S ∩ T = ∅. We have
v(S ∪ T )
= I (XS∪T ;X0|XSc∩T c) (17a)
= I (XS ;X0|XSc∩T c) + I (XT ;X0|XT c) (17b)
= H (XS |XSc∩T c)−H (XS |X0XSc)
+ I (XT ;X0|XT c) (17c)
> I (XS ;X0|XSc) + I (XT ;X0|XT c) (17d)
= v(S) + v(T ), (17e)
where (17c) holds by (1), (17d) holds because conditioning
reduces entropy. 
Superadditivity implies that there is an interest in forming a
large coalition to obtain a larger secret-key sum rate, however,
large coalition might not be in the individual interest of the
agents, in the sense that increasing the secret-key sum-rate of
a given coalition might not lead to an increased individual
secret-key rate for every player in the coalition. A useful
concept to overcome this complication is the core of the game.
Definition 6 (e.g. [36]). The core of a superadditive game
(L, v) is defined as follows.
C(v) ,{
(Rl)l∈L :
∑
l∈L
Rl = v(L) and
∑
i∈S
Ri > v(S),∀S ⊂ L
}
.
(18)
Observe that for any point in the core, the grand coalition,
i.e., the coalition L, is in the best interest to all agents, since
the set of inequalities in (18) ensures that no coalition of
agents can increase its secret-key sum-rate by leaving the
grand coalition. Observe also that for any point in the core
the maximal secret-key sum rate v(L) for the grand coalition
is achieved. In general, the core of a game can be empty.
However, we will show that the game we have defined has a
non-empty core.
Definition 6 further clarifies the choice of the value func-
tion v. A coalition S wishes to be associated with a value
v(S) as large as possible, while the agents outside S wish
v(S) to be as small as possible to demand a higher share
of v(L). The latter achieve their goal by waiving a threat
argument, which consists in arguing that they could adopt
the strategy that minimizes v(S) by publicly disclosing their
source observations, whereas coalition S achieves its goal
by arguing that it can always achieve the secret-key sum-
rate capacity of Theorem 1, irrespective of the strategy of
agents in Sc. This formulation is analogous to the one for the
Gaussian multiple access channel problem studied in [2], and
the Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel problem studied
in [37], where users can also form coalitions to request a larger
communication sum-rate by means of jamming threats, and is
generically termed as alpha effectiveness or alpha theory [33]–
[35].
We now introduce the notion of convexity for a game to
better understand the structure of the core of our game.
5Definition 7 ([38]). A game (L, v) is convex if v : 2L → R+
is supermodular, i.e.,
∀U ,V ⊆ L, v(U) + v(V) 6 v(U ∪ V) + v(U ∩ V). (19)
The intuition behind this definition is that supermodularity
provides a stronger incentive to form coalition than superad-
ditity. Indeed, supermodularity of a function v : 2L → R+ can
equivalently be defined as follows [38]
∀l ∈ L,∀T ⊆ L\{l},∀S ⊆ T ,
v(S ∪ {l})− v(S) 6 v(T ∪ {l})− v(T ), (20)
which means that, in addition to superaddivity, the contribution
of a single agent to a given coalition increases with the
size of the coalition it joins. We also refer to [38] for other
interpretations of supermodularity.
Proposition 1. The game (L, v) defined in (12) is convex.
Proof. For any S ⊆ L, we have
I(XS ;X0|XSc) = H(XS |XSc)−H(XS |XScX0) (21a)
= H(XS |XSc)−H(XS |X0) (21b)
= H(XL)−H(XSc)−H(XS |X0), (21c)
where we have used the Markov chain (1) in the second
equality. Then, S 7→ −H(XS |X0) is supermodular because
for any U ,V ⊆ L,
H(XU∪V |X0) +H(XU∩V |X0) (22a)
= H(XU |X0) +H(XV\U |XUX0) +H(XU∩V |X0) (22b)
6 H(XU |X0) +H(XV\U |XU∩VX0)
+H(XU∩V |X0) (22c)
= H(XU |X0) +H(XV |X0), (22d)
where (22c) holds because conditioning reduces entropy. Con-
sequently, S 7→ −H(XSc) is also supermodular since for
any supermodular function w, S 7→ w(Sc) is supermodular.
Hence, by (21c) we conclude that v is supermodular. 
A consequence of Proposition 1 is that the core of our game
is non-empty.
Corollary 1. By [38], any convex game has non-empty core.
Hence, by Proposition 1, our game defined in (12) has a non-
empty core C(v).
Remark 3. From a geometric point of view,{
(Rl)l∈L :
∑
i∈S Ri > v(S),∀S ⊂ L
}
is a contrapoly-
matroid [39] when v is convex, and its intersection with the
hyperplane
{
(Rl)l∈L :
∑
l∈LRl = v(L)
}
forms the core of
v [38]. See Example 2 and Figure 2 for an illustration.
Remark 4. In the case of a convex game, the core coincides
with the bargaining set for the grand coalition [40] and thus
admits an alternative interpretation, in terms of stable allo-
cations resulting from a sequence of “threats” and “counter-
threats”, see [40], [41] for further details.
We provide an alternative characterization of the core that
will turn out to be useful in the following. It can also be viewed
as a converse for our problem since the secret-key rate-tuples
in the core are upper-bounded.
Theorem 2. The core C(v) of the game (L, v) defined in (12)
is given by{
(Rl)l∈L : ∀S ⊆ L,
I(XS ;X0)− I(XS ;XSc) 6
∑
i∈S
Ri 6 I(XS ;X0)
}
.
(23)
Proof. We have the following equivalences(∑
l∈L
Rl = v(L) and
∑
i∈S
Ri > v(S),∀S ⊂ L
)
⇐⇒(∑
i∈S
Ri = v(L)−
∑
i∈Sc
Ri and
∑
i∈S
Ri > v(S),∀S ⊂ L
)
⇐⇒(
v(L)− v(Sc) >
∑
i∈S
Ri > v(S),∀S ⊆ L
)
.
Finally, for any S ⊆ L, we have
v(L)− v(Sc) = I(XL;X0)− I(XSc ;X0|XS) (25a)
= I(XS ;X0), (25b)
and by the Markov chain (1),
v(S) = I(XS ;X0)− I(XS ;XSc). (26)

B. Candidates for the secret-key rate allocation
Although C(v) has been shown to be non-empty in Sec-
tion III-A, a remaining issue is now to choose a specific rate-
tuple allocation in the core. Shapley introduced a solution
concept to ensure fairness according to the following axioms.
(i) Efficiency axiom, i.e., the secret-key sum-rate capacity
for the grand coalition is achieved;
(ii) Symmetry axiom, i.e., any two agents that equally con-
tribute to any coalition in the sense that for any i, j ∈ L,
for any S ⊆ L such that i 6= j and i, j /∈ S ,
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}), obtain the same individual
secret-key rate;
(iii) Dummy axiom, i.e., any agent that does not bring value
to any coalition he can join, in the sense, for any i ∈ L,
for any S ⊆ L such that i /∈ S , v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S),
receives a null secret-key rate;
(iv) Additivity axiom, i.e., for any two games v and u played
by the agents, the individual secret-key length obtained
by an agent for the game u+ v, is the sum of secret-key
lengths when u and v are played separately.
We give an interpretation of the additivity axiom in the
situation described next. For i ∈ {1, 2}, assume that the
agents collect N source observations, denoted by (XNL,i, X
N
0,i),
for a source with fixed probability distribution pXL,iX0,i . For
instance, when the source is obtained from channel gains
6measurements [17]–[20], the source statistics will change if
the agents randomly change their physical location over time.
We also assume that pXL,1X0,1XL,2X0,2 = pXL,1X0,1pXL,2X0,2 .
Let i ∈ {1, 2} and define i¯ = 3 − i. We define the game
vi as extracting keys from (XNL,i, X
N
0,i) when the distribution
pXL,¯i,X0,¯i is unknown, and we define the game w as extracting
keys from (XNL,1, X
N
0,1, X
N
L,2, X
N
0,2) when both distributions
pXL,1X0,1 and pXL,2X0,2 are known. By independence and by
Theorem 1, the value function associated with w is the sum
of the value functions of v1 and v2. In this setup, we interpret
the additivity axiom as follows. If the agents extract keys from
(XNL,i, X
N
0,i) being ignorant of the distribution pXL,¯i,X0,¯i , then
they obtain the same payoff as if they had to extract keys
from (XNL,1, X
N
0,1, X
N
L,2, X
N
0,2) with the knowledge of both
pXL,1,X0,1 and pXL,2,X0,2 . Hence, under the same assumptions,
the additivity axiom means that even if the agents do not know
in advance the number M of source observation batches from
independent sources they are going to obtain, they can, after
obtaining each batch of observations, successively generate
keys without this knowledge and obtain the same individual
key lengths as if they had waited to obtain the M batches to
generate keys.
Example 1. We have the following intuitive property. If there
exist i, j ∈ L such that i 6= j and pXi|X0 = pXj |X0 , then
Agent i and Agent j satisfy the symmetry axiom described
above.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ L, and S ⊆ L such that i 6= j and i, j /∈ S .
Define Sc , Sc\{i, j}. We have
v(S ∪ {i})
= H(XL)−H(X(S∪{i})c)−H(XS∪{i}|X0) (27a)
= H(XL)−H(XjXSc)−H(Xi|X0)−H(XS |X0) (27b)
= H(XL)−H(XiXSc)−H(Xj |X0)−H(XS |X0) (27c)
= v(S ∪ {j}), (27d)
where (27a) holds by (21c), (27b) holds by definition of
Sc and by the Markov chain (1), (27c) holds because
by the Markov chain (1) pXiXScX0 = pXi|X0pXScX0 =
pXj |X0pXScX0 = pXjXScX0 , which implies by marginaliza-
tion over X0, pXiXSc = pXjXSc , which in turn implies
H(XiXSc) = H(XjXSc), (27d) holds similar to (27a)
and (27b). 
Proposition 2 (e.g. [42]). Given a coalitional game (L, v),
there exists a unique L-tuple
(
RShapl
)
l∈L
that satisfies the
efficiency, symmetry, dummy, and additivity axiom described
above.
(
RShapl
)
l∈L
is called the Shapley value.
For convex games, the Shapley value is in the core, and is
explicited in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The Shapley value of (L, v) defined in (12) is
in C(v) and is given by ∀l ∈ L,
RShapl =
∑
S⊆L\{l}
|S|! (L− |S|−1)!
L!
(v(S ∪ {l})− v(S))
(28a)
= I (Xl;X0)− 1
L
∑
S⊆L\{l}
(
L− 1
|S|
)−1
I (Xl;XS) .
(28b)
Proof. The fact that the Shapley value belongs to the core
follows by [38] from the convexity of (L, v) proved in
Proposition 1. (28a) is also from [38]. (28b) is obtained by
remarking that for any l ∈ L, for any S ⊆ L\{l}
v(S ∪ {l})− v(S)
= H(XSc) +H(XS |X0)−H(X(S∪{l})c)
−H(XS∪{l}|X0) (29a)
= H(XSc∩{l}|XSc\{l})−H(Xl|X0XS) (29b)
= H
(
Xl|XSc\{l}
)−H (Xl|X0) (29c)
= I (Xl;X0)− I
(
Xl;XSc\{l}
)
, (29d)
where (29a) holds by (21c), (29c) holds because l /∈ S and by
the Markov chain (1). Finally, we conclude by observing that∑
S⊆L\{l}
|S|! (L− |S|−1)!
L!
=
L−1∑
k=0
(
L− 1
k
)
k! (L− k − 1)!
L!
= 1, (30)
and that a change of variables yields∑
S⊆L\{l}
|S|! (L− |S|−1)!
L!
I
(
Xl;XSc\{l}
)
=
∑
S⊆L\{l}
|S|! (L− |S|−1)!
L!
I (Xl;XS) . (31)

Remark 5. Geometrically, the Shapley value corresponds
to the center of gravity of the vertices of C(v) [38]. See
Example 2 and Figure 2 for an illustration.
Observe that (28b) quantifies the difference of key
length obtained for Agent l, l ∈ L, between the case
L = 1 and the case L > 1. Note also that the
term 1L
∑
S⊆L\{l}
(
L− 1
|S|
)−1
I (Xl;XS) is upper-bounded
by I(Xl;XL\{l}) according to Theorem 2 since the Shapley
value belongs to the core.
Note that the Shapley value might not always be meaningful
as a solution concept. In particular, the additivity axiom might
not always be relevant in our problem, for instance, if the
agents do not obtain several batches of observations from
sources with independent statistics. Finding an axiomatized
solution concept that could be universally agreed upon in our
setting remains an open problem.
We next discuss the nucleolus as solution concept and one of
its non-axiomatized interpretation that has attracted a certain
interest in many studies.
Definition 8 ( [43]). Define the set Y , {y = (yi)i∈L ∈
RL+ :
∑
i∈L yi = v(L)}. For y ∈ Y , for S ∈ 2L, define
the excess e(y,S) , v(S) −∑i∈S yi, and define the vector
θ(y) = (θi(y))i∈J1,2LK ∈ R2L as (e(y,S))S∈2L sorted in
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Fig. 2. Core, Shapley value, and nucleolus of the game described in
Example 2.
nonincreasing order, i.e., for i, j ∈ J1, 2LK, i < j =⇒
θi(y) > θj(y). The nucleolus is defined as
{y0 ∈ Y : θ(y0)  θ(y),∀y ∈ Y}, (32)
where  denote the lexicographic order, i.e., for y(1),y(2) ∈
Y ,(
y(1)  y(2)
)
⇐⇒
(
y(1) = y(2)
or ∃i0,
(
∀j < i0, y(1)j = y(2)j and y(1)i0 < y
(2)
i0
))
. (33)
A possible interpretation of the nucleolus is to see the excess
e(y,S) , v(S) − ∑i∈S yi for some y ∈ Y , S ∈ 2L, as
an indicator of dissatisfaction of coalition S associated with
y (the higher the excess, the higher the dissatisfaction). One
thus might want to choose the y that minimizes the maximal
excess, i.e., the first component of θ. If several choices for y
are possible, one can decide to select y such that the second
largest excess, i.e., the second component of θ, is minimized.
One can then continue until a unique choice for y is obtained
as stated in Proposition 4. This interpretation appears, for
instance, in [36].
Proposition 4 ([43]). For a convex game, the nucleolus is a
singleton and belongs to the core.
The nucleolus has, however, no closed-form formula and
involves the resolution of successive minimization problems.
We illustrate this concept in the following example. For
completeness and to compute the nucleolus in Example 2, we
summarize in Algorithm 1 a concise description of the method
described in [44], [45].
Remark 6. In the case of a convex game, the nucleolus
coincides with the kernel [36] and thus admits another in-
terpretation, see [36, Section 5] for further details.
Example 2. Let X0 be a Bernoulli random variable with
Algorithm 1 Nucleolus Computation
1: k ← 0
2: E0 ← ∅
3: while the system (Sk) has rank < L do
4: k ← k + 1
5: Solve the following linear program and let z∗k denote
the value of the objective function obtained
Minimize zk subject to
zk +
∑
i∈S
xi > v(S),∀S ⊂ L s.t. S /∈ ∪k−1j=0Ej (Ek)
z∗j +
∑
i∈S
xi = v(S),∀S ∈ Ej , j ∈ J1, k − 1K∑
i∈L
xi = v(L)
 (Sk)
6: Define Ek , {S ⊂ L : (Ek) holds with equality}
7: end while
8: return the nucleolus
(
RNucli
)
i∈L = (xi)i∈L
parameter q ∈]0, 1/2[. Define Xl , X0 ⊕ Bl, ∀l ∈ L, where
the Bl’s are independent Bernoulli random variables with
parameter pl ∈]0, 1/2[. Let Hb(·) denote the binary entropy
and define for any x ∈ [0, 1], x¯ = 1− x. For any S ⊆ L, we
have the following formula
v(S) = H(XL)−H(XSc)−H(XS |X0) (34a)
= H(XL)−H(XSc)−
∑
i∈S Hb(pi) (34b)
= −∑T ⊆L fL(T ) log fL(T )
+
∑
T ⊆Sc fSc(T ) log fSc(T )
−∑i∈S Hb(pi), (34c)
where (34a) holds by (21c), (34b) holds by independence of
the Bl’s, and where in (34c) we have defined for any S ⊆ L
fS : 2S → R+, T 7→ q
∏
i∈T
pi
∏
j∈S\T
p¯j + q¯
∏
i∈T
p¯i
∏
j∈S\T
pj .
(35)
Assume now that L = 3, and (q p1 p2 p3) =
(0.40 0.20 0.27 0.25). We obtain v({1}) ≈ 0.17134,
v({2}) ≈ 0.08205, v({3}) ≈ 0.10142, v({1, 2}) ≈ 0.28771,
v({1, 3}) ≈ 0.31679, v({2, 3}) ≈ 0.20155, v({1, 2, 3}) ≈
0.46921. Using Algorithm 1 and Proposition 3, we obtain the
following secret-key rates
RNucl1 ∈ [0.2109, 0.2110], RShap1 ∈ [0.2165, 0.2166],
RNucl2 ∈ [0.1172, 0.1173], RShap2 ∈ [0.1142, 0.1143],
RNucl3 ∈ [0.1410, 0.1411], RShap3 ∈ [0.1384, 0.1385].
The core of the game, as well as the Shapley value and the
nucleolus are depicted in Figure 2.
IV. HOW TO ACHIEVE ANY POINT OF THE CORE
We have seen in Section III that the grand coalition, i.e.,
the coalition L, is in the best interest of all agents, and we
have characterized the acceptable operating points as the core
8of the game. Assuming that the grand coalition agrees on an
operating point in the core, we now would like to answer
whether there exists a secret-key generation protocol for this
specific operating point. We show in this section the following
three results. In Theorem 3, we claim that the coding scheme
presented in Section IV-A achieves for the grand coalition a
region that contains the core C(v). The proof is presented in
Section IV-B. In Theorem 4, we provide an achievable region
for any coalition S ⊂ L of agents. The coding scheme and
its analysis partly rely on Theorem 3 and are discussed in
Appendix C. Finally, we complete the proof of Theorem 1
with Corollary 2 obtained from Theorem 4.
Theorem 3. Consider a DMS (XL ×X0, pXLX0) such that
∀l ∈ L, |Xl|= 2. Any rate tuple in
RL ,
{
(Rl)l∈L : 0 6
∑
i∈S
Ri 6 I(XS ;X0),∀S ⊆ L
}
(36)
is achievable by the grand coalition, in the sense of Defini-
tion 2, with the coding scheme of Section IV-A. Moreover, by
Theorem 2 we have
RL ⊇ C(v). (37)
Theorem 4. Consider a DMS (XL ×X0, pXLX0) such that
∀l ∈ L, |Xl|= 2 and the Markov chain (1) holds. Any rate
tuple in
RS ,
{
(Rl)l∈S : 0 6
∑
i∈T
Ri 6 I(XT ;X0|XSc),∀T ⊆ S
}
(38)
is achievable in the sense of Definition 4 by the coalition of
agents S ⊂ L.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Corollary 2. Theorem 4 implies the achievability part of
Theorem 1, i.e., the secret-key sum rate I(XS ;X0|XSc) is
achievable by the coalition S ⊆ L.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
Remark 7. Note that Theorem 3 does not require the Markov
chain (1). Note also that Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 extend
to prime size alphabets by using [46, Lemma 7] in place of
Lemma 2.
Remark 8. Note that the region in Theorem 3 has also
been shown achievable in [23] without the requirements of
prime size alphabets. The main difference between Theorem 3
and [23] is that Theorem 3 provides an explicit coding scheme.
A. Coding Scheme
The principle of the coding scheme is to separately deal
with reliability and secrecy, as it can be done for secret-
key generation between two users [47], albeit with additional
complications. More specifically, a reconciliation step is first
performed to allow the base station to reconstruct the observa-
tions XNL of the agents. Then, during a privacy amplification
step, each agent extracts from its observations a key that can
be reconstructed at the base station. The reconciliation step
itself does not present any difficulty, the main complications,
compared to a two-user scenario, are (i) to deal with a
distributed setting in the privacy amplification step and (ii)
to analyze the combination of the reconciliation and privacy
amplification steps, as detailed in the next section.
Our coding scheme operates over B blocks of length N ,
where N and B are powers of 2. We define B , J1, BK. We
omit indexation of the variables over blocks because encoding
is identical for all blocks. The reconciliation step, described
in Algoritm 2, makes use of polar codes. In particular we
introduce the following notation. For n ∈ N and N , 2n, let
Gn ,
[
1 0
1 1
]⊗n
be the source polarization transform defined
in [26]. For any l ∈ L, we define
UNl , XNl Gn, (39)
moreover, for any set I ⊆ J1, NK, we define UNl [I] ,
((Ul)i)i∈I , where (Ul)i denotes the i-th component of the
vector UNl , i ∈ I. For any l ∈ L, for any S ⊆ L, we also
define the following “high entropy” and “very high entropy”
sets.
HXl|X0X1:l−1XS
,
{
i ∈ J1, NK :H ((Ul)i|(Ul)i−1XN0 XN1:l−1XNS ) > δN} ,
(40)
VXl|X0X1:l−1XS
,
{
i ∈ J1, NK :H ((Ul)i|(Ul)i−1XN0 XN1:l−1XNS ) > 1− δN}
(41)
where we have defined X1:l−1 , (Xj)j∈J1:l−1K and XS ,
(Xj)j∈S . An interpretation of these sets that will be used in
our analysis can be summarized in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Source coding with side information [26]). Con-
sider a discrete memoryless source with joint probability
distribution pXY over X × Y with |X |= 2 and Y finite.
Define AN , XNGn, and for δN , 2−N
β
with β ∈]0, 1/2[,
the setHX|Y ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H(Ai|Ai−1Y N ) > δN} . Given
AN [HX|Y ] and Y N it is possible to form ÂN by the successive
cancellation (SC) decoder of [26] such that limN→∞ P[ÂN 6=
AN ] = 0. Moreover, limN→∞|HX|Y |/N = H(X|Y ).
Lemma 2 (Privacy amplification [29]). Consider a dis-
crete memoryless source with joint probability distribution
pXZ over X × Z with |X |= 2 and Z finite. Define
AN , XNGn, and for δN , 2−N
β
with β ∈]0, 1/2[,
the set VX|Z ,
{
i ∈ J1, NK : H(Ai|Ai−1ZN ) > 1− δN} .
AN [VX|Z ] is almost uniform and independent from ZN in
the sense limN→∞ V(pAN [VX|Z ]ZN , pUpZN ) = 0, where
pU is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}|VX|Z |. Moreover,
limN→∞|VX|Z |/N = H(X|Z).
Hence, by Lemma 1, the vector UNl [HXl|X0X1:l−1XS ],
l ∈ L, ensures near lossless reconstruction of XNl
given (XN0 , X
N
1:l−1, X
N
S ). By Lemma 2, the vector
UNl [VXl|X0X1:l−1XS ], l ∈ L, is almost uniform and
independent from (XN0 , X
N
1:l−1, X
N
S ). Note also that by
definition VXl|X0X1:l−1XS ⊂ HXl|X0X1:l−1XS . We refer
9to [29], [46] for further discussion of theses sets.
Algorithm 2 Reconciliation protocol
1: for Block b ∈ B do
2: Define X˘N∅ , ∅
3: for l ∈ L do
4: Agent l computes UNl , XNl Gn and transmits Al ,
UNl [HXl|X0X1:l−1 ] to the base station over the public
channel
5: Given Al, XN0 , and X˘
N
1:l−1, the base station forms
X˘Nl an estimate of X
N
l using the SC decoder of [26]
6: end for
7: Define AL , (Al)l∈L
8: Define X˘NL , (X˘Nl )l∈L
9: end for
10: Let ABL denote the total public communication over the
B blocks
11: The base station and the agents perform a final round of
reconciliation on (X˘NL )
B (obtained above) and (XNL )
B as
follows
12: Define X̂NB∅ , ∅
13: for l ∈ L do
14: Agent l ∈ L computes V NB , XNBl Glog2(NB) and
transmits A0,l , V NB [HXNl |XN1:l−1X˘NL ] to the base
station over the public channel
15: Given A0,l, (X˘NL )
B , and X̂NB1:l−1, the base station forms
X̂NBl an estimate of X
NB
l using the SC decoder of [26]
16: end for
17: Define X̂NBL , (X̂NBl )l∈L
18: Define A0 , (A0,l)l∈L
Algorithm 3 Privacy amplification protocol
1: for Block b ∈ B do
2: for Agent l ∈ L do
3: Compute Kl , Fl(XNl )
4: Publicly transmit the choice of Fl to the base station
5: end for
6: for l ∈ L do
7: The base station computes Kl , Fl(XNl )
8: end for
9: end for
The privacy amplification step, described in Algorithm 3,
relies on two-universal hash functions [48], [49].
Definition 9. A family F of two-universal hash functions F =
{f : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}r} is such that
∀x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}N , x 6= x′ =⇒ P[F (x) = F (x′)] 6 2−r,
(42)
where F is a function uniformly chosen in F .
For l ∈ L, we let Fl : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}rl , be uniformly
chosen in a family Fl of two-universal hash functions. Note
that rl represents the key length obtained by Agent l. The main
difficulty in the analysis of the privacy amplification step is to
find the admissible values, in the sense of Definition 2, for rl.
We leave these quantities unspecified in this section, and will
specify them in Section IV-B.
B. Coding Scheme Analysis
1) Reconciliation Analysis: Line 15 in Algorithm 2 ensures
that for a fixed N ,
P
[
X̂NBL 6= (XNL )B
]
6
∑
l∈L
P
[
X̂NBl 6= XNBl |X̂NB1:l−1 = XNB1:l−1
]
(43a)
B→∞−−−−→ 0, (43b)
where the limit follows from Lemma 1.
2) Privacy Amplification Analysis: We will use the follow-
ing notation. The indicator function is denoted by 1{ω}, which
is equal to 1 if the predicate ω is true and 0 otherwise. For a
discrete random variable X distributed according to pX over
the alphabet X , we let
T N (X) ,
{
xN ∈ XN :
∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
1{xi = a} − pX(a)
∣∣∣∣
6 pX(a),∀a ∈ X
}
(44)
denote the -letter-typical set associated with pX for se-
quences of length N , see, for instance, [50], and define
µX , minx∈SX p(x), where SX , {x ∈ X : p(x) > 0}.
Additionally, the min-entropy of X is defined as
H∞(X) , − log
(
max
x∈X
pX(x)
)
. (45)
We will need the following two lemmas. Lemma 3 is a
refined version of [51] meant to relate a min-entropy to a
Shannon entropy, which is easier to study, and Lemma 4 can be
interpreted as quantifying how much information is revealed
about XNS knowing the public communication AL.
Lemma 3 ( [52, Lemma 1.1] [51]). Let  > 0. Consider a
DMS (X × Z, pXZ) and define the random variable Θ as
Θ , 1
{
(XB , ZB) ∈ T B2 (XZ)
}
1
{
ZB ∈ T B (Z)
}
, (46)
Then, P[Θ = 1] > 1− δ0 (B), with
δ0 (B) , 2|SX |e−
2BµX/3 + 2|SXZ |e−2BµXZ/3. (47)
Moreover, if zB ∈ T B (Z), then
H∞(XB |ZB = zB ,Θ = 1)
> B(1− )H(X|Z) + log(1− δ1 (B)), (48)
where δ1 (B) , 2|SXZ |e−
2BµXZ/6.
Lemma 4. For any S ⊆ L, we have
H(XNS |AL) > NI(XS ;X0)− o(N). (49)
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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We are now equipped to show (52h). Let S ⊆ L and let
Θ , 1
{
(XNBL , A
B
L , A0) ∈ T B2 (XNL ALA0)
}
× 1{(ABL , A0) ∈ T B (ALA0)} . (50)
Fix (aBL , a0) ∈ T B (AL, A0). We define
Ω , 1
{
H∞(XNBS |ABL = aBL , A0 = a0,Θ = 1)
> H∞(XNBS |ABL = aBL ,Θ = 1)
−∑l∈L|HXNl |XN1:l−1X˘NL |−√NB} . (51)
We have
H∞(XNBS |ABL = aBL , A0 = a0,Θ = 1,Ω = 1) (52a)
> H∞(XNBS |ABL = aBL ,Θ = 1)
−∑l∈L|HXNl |XN1:l−1X˘NL |−√NB (52b)
= H∞(XNBS |ABL = aBL ,Θ = 1)
−∑l∈L(BH(XNl |XN1:l−1X˘NL ) + o(B))−√NB (52c)
= H∞(XNBS |ABL = aBL ,Θ = 1)
−BH(XNL |X˘NL )− o(NB) (52d)
> H∞(XNBS |ABL = aBL ,Θ = 1)
− o(NB) (52e)
> B(1− )H(XNS |AL)
+ log(1− δ1 (N,B))− o(NB) (52f)
> (1− )(NB · I(XS ;X0)− o(N) ·B)
+ log(1− δ1 (N,B))− o(NB) (52g)
= (1− ) ·NB · I(XS ;X0) + δ2 (N,B), (52h)
where (52b) holds by definition of Ω, (52c) holds by Lemma 1,
(52e) holds by Fano’s inequality because similar to the analysis
in Section IV-B1, P[X˘NL 6= XNL ] N→∞−−−−→ 0, (52f) holds by
Lemma 3 applied to the DMS (XNS × AL, pXNS AL), (52g)
holds by Lemma 4, and in (52h) we have defined
δ2 (N,B)
, −o(N) ·B(1− ) + log(1− δ1 (N,B))− o(NB). (53)
Remark 9. Unfortunately, unlike the two-user secret-key gen-
eration setting considered in [51], it is not possible to use [51,
Lemma 10] to obtain a tight lower bound on H∞(XNBS |ABL =
aBL ). We use Lemmas 3, 4 to circumvent this issue.
We will then need the following version of the leftover hash
lemma [49], [53]–[55].
Lemma 5 (Leftover hash lemma for concatenated hash func-
tions). Let XL , (Xl)l∈L and Z be random variables
distributed according to pXLZ over XL × Z . For l ∈ L, let
Fl : {0, 1}nl → {0, 1}rl , be uniformly chosen in a family Fl
of two-universal hash functions. Define sL ,
∏
l∈L sl, where
sl , |Fl|, l ∈ L, and for any S ⊆ L, define rS ,
∑
i∈S ri.
Define also FL , (Fl)l∈L and
FL(XL) , (F1(X1)||F2(X2)||. . . ||FL(XL)), (54)
where || denotes concatenation. Then, for any z ∈ Z , we have
V(pFL(XL),FL|Z=z, pUKpUF ) 6
√√√√∑
S⊆L
S6=∅
2rS−H∞(XS |Z=z),
(55)
where pUK and pUF are the uniform distribution over J1, 2rLK,
and J1, sLK, respectively.
A consequence of (55) is
V(pFL(XL),FL,Z , pUKpUF pZ) 6
√√√√∑
S⊆L
S6=∅
2rS−H∞(XS |Z),
(56)
where we have used the average conditional min-entropy of
X given Z defined as in [54] by
H∞(X|Z) , − log(EZ max
x
pX|Z(x|Z)). (57)
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Combining (52h) and Lemma 5, we are able to determine
the admissible values for rl, l ∈ L, as follows.
V(pFL(XNBL )FLABLA0 , pUKpUF pABLA0)
6 V(pFL(XNBL )FLABLA0ΘΩ, pUKpUF pABLA0ΘΩ) (58a)
= E
[
V(pFL(XNBL )FLABLA0|ΘΩ, pUKpUF pABLA0|ΘΩ)
]
(58b)
6 2P[Θ = 0 ∨ Ω = 0]+
V(pFL(XNBL )FLABLA0|Θ=1,Ω=1, pUKpUF pABLA0|Θ=1,Ω=1)
(58c)
6 2P[Θ = 0 ∨ Ω = 0]
+ E
[
V(pFL(XNBL )FL|ABLA0Θ=1,Ω=1, pUKpUF )
]
(58d)
6 2P[Θ = 0 ∨ Ω = 0]
+ E
√√√√∑
S⊆L
S6=∅
2rS−H∞(X
NB
S |ABL=aBL ,A0=a0,Θ=1,Ω=1) (58e)
6 2P[Θ = 0 ∨ Ω = 0]
+ E
√√√√∑
S⊆L
S6=∅
2rS−(1−)·NB·I(XS ;X0)−δ2 (N,B) (58f)
= 2P[Θ = 0 ∨ Ω = 0]
+
√√√√∑
S⊆L
S6=∅
2rS−(1−)·NB·I(XS ;X0)−δ2 (N,B) (58g)
6 2δ0 (N,B) + 2 · 2−
√
NB
+
√√√√∑
S⊆L
S6=∅
2rS−(1−)·NB·I(XS ;X0)−δ2 (N,B), (58h)
where (58a) holds by marginalization over Θ and the triangle
inequality, in (58b) the expectation is with respect to pΘ,Ω,
(58c) holds because V(·, ·) is upper bounded by 2, in (58d) the
expectation is with respect to pABLA0|Θ=1,Ω=1, (58e) holds by
Lemma 5 with the substitutions z ← (aBL , a0,Θ = 1,Ω = 1)
and XL ← XNBL and the expectation is with respect to
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pABLA0|Θ=1,Ω=1, (58f) holds by (52h) and the expectation is
with respect to pABLA0|Θ=1,Ω=1, (58h) holds by the union
bound, Lemma 3, the definition of Ω and [51, Lemma 10].
Finally, we conclude that Theorem 3 holds by Remark 1
and (58h).
V. NON-DEGRADED SOURCE CASE WHEN L = 2
In this section, we consider the setting described in Sec-
tion II when L = 2, public communication is restricted to be
one-way from the agents to the base station, and when (1)
does not hold. Similar to Section II, the value function v∗ of
this game is defined as
v∗ : 2L → R+,S 7→ max
aS
∈S(S)
min
aL\S
∈S(L\S)
∑
i∈S
pii(aS , aL\S) (59)
such that for any S ⊆ L, v(S) corresponds to the maximal
secret-key sum-rate achievable by coalition S when no specific
strategy is assumed for the agents in L\S.
Next, we characterize the value function v∗ by providing a
counterpart to Theorem 1.
Proposition 5. We have
v∗({1})
= max
V1−U1−X1−(X0,X2)
[I(U1;X0|V1)− I(U1;X2|V1)]+,
(60a)
v∗({2})
= max
V2−U2−X2−(X0,X1)
[I(U2;X0|V2)− I(U2;X1|V2)]+,
(60b)
v∗({1, 2})
= I(X1X2;X0), (60c)
where [x]+ , max(x, 0) for any x ∈ R.
Proof. v∗({1}) and v∗({2}) are obtained from [15].
v∗({1, 2}) is obtained from [21], [23]. 
Remark 10. If L > 2, then v∗(L) = I(XL;X0) by [23], and
for any l ∈ L, v∗({l}) can be obtained from [15]. However,
for any S ⊂ L such that |S|> 1, a closed form expression for
v∗(S) is unknown.
Remark 11. In the case of two-way communication between
the base station and the agents, v∗({1, 2}) has the same
expression. However, in this case, no closed-form expression
is known for v∗({1}) or v∗({2}), which both correspond to
a secret-key capacity between two parties in presence of an
eavesdropper [15], [16].
Property 2. The game (L, v∗) defined in (59) is superadditive.
Proof. Any two disjoint coalitions S, T ⊆ L, S ∩ T = ∅,
obtain secret-key sum-rate capacities that cannot add up to a
quantity strictly larger than the secret-key sum-rate capacity of
the coalition S ∪ T . Note indeed that the reliability, secrecy,
and uniformity constraints for coalitions S and T imply a
reliability, secrecy, and uniformity constraint for the coalition
S ∪ T . Indeed, we have
P[K̂S∪T 6= KS∪T ] 6 P[K̂S 6= KS ] + P[K̂T 6= KT ]. (61)
Next, we have
I
(
KS∪T ;AS∪TXN(S∪T )c
)
= I
(
KS ;ASATXN(S∪T )c
)
+ I
(
KT ;ASATXN(S∪T )c |KS
)
(62a)
6 I
(
KS ;ASATXN(S∪T )c
)
+ I
(
KT ;AT ASXN(S∪T )cKS
)
(62b)
6 I
(
KS ;ASXNSc
)
+ I
(
KT ;ATXNT c
)
, (62c)
where in (62a) we decompose AS∪T in AS and AT , the public
communication emitted by the agents in S and T , respectively,
(62b) holds by positivity of the mutual information and the
chain rule, (62c) holds because (AS , AT , XN(S∪T )c) is a func-
tion of (AS , XNSc) and (AT , AS , X
N
(S∪T )c ,KS) is a function
of (AT , XNT c).
Finally, we have
log|KS∪T |−H(KS∪T )
= log|KS |−H(KS) + log|KT |−H(KT )
+ I(KS ;KT ) (63a)
6 log|KS |−H(KS) + log|KT |−H(KT )
+ I
(
KS ;XNSc
)
. (63b)

Note that the proof of Property 2 is valid for any L, not
only L = 2. Hence, we can define the core of the game as
in Definition 6. From Property 2, we immediately obtain the
following property since superadditivity implies convexity for
L = 2.
Property 3. The game (L, v∗) defined in (59) is convex.
Next, from [38] and Property 3, we deduce the following
corollary.
Corollary 3. The game (L, v∗) defined in (59) has a non-
empty core.
As an example of solution concept, we characterize the
Shapley value discussed in Section III-B for (L, v∗).
Example 3. The Shapley value of the game (L, v∗) defined
in (59) is given for i ∈ {1, 2} and i¯ , 3− i by
RShapi =
1
2
I(X1X2;X0)
+
1
2
max
Vi−Ui−Xi−(X0,Xi¯)
[I(Ui;X0|Vi)− I(Ui;Xi¯|Vi)]+
− 1
2
max
Vi¯−Ui¯−Xi¯−(X0,Xi)
[I(Ui¯;X0|Vi¯)− I(Ui¯;Xi|Vi¯)]+ .
(64)
VI. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE LEVELS OF SECURITY
CLEARANCE
We now consider that multiple levels of security clearance
exist in our model. Specifically, each agent has a pre-defined
security clearance level, and it is required that keys generated
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by agents at a given level must be be kept secret from the
agents at a strictly superior level. Note that this setting is
related to the problem of simultaneously generating private
and secret keys [56], [57].
A. Model
Let Q ∈ N∗ and define Q , J1, QK. For q ∈ Q, let Lq ∈ N∗
and let Lq be a set of Lq agents. In the following, we consider
Q sets (Lq)q∈Q of agents and one base station depicted in
Figure 3. We also use the notation LQ ,
⋃
q∈Q Lq to denote
all the agents in the Q sets.
1) Definition of the source model: Define XLQ as the Carte-
sian product of
∑Q
q=1 Lq finite alphabets Xl, l ∈ LQ. Consider
a discrete memoryless source (DMS)
(
XLQ ×X0, pXLQX0
)
,
where X0 is a finite alphabet and XLQ , (Xl)l∈LQ . For
l ∈ LQ, Agent l observes the component Xl of the DMS,
and the base station observes the component X0. The source
is assumed to follow the following Markov chain: for any
S, T ⊂ LQ such that S ∩ T = ∅,
XS −X0 −XT . (65)
The source’s statistics are assumed known to all parties,
and communication is allowed over an authenticated noiseless
public channel.
2) Description of the objectives for the agents: The goal of
Agent l ∈ LQ is to generate an individual secret-key with the
base station. The index q ∈ Q is meant to describe different
sets of agents that do not have the same security constraints. In
particular, we require that for any q ∈ Q, the keys generated by
the agents in Lq are secret, in an information-theoretic sense,
from the agents in
⋃
i∈Jq+1,QK Li but need not to be secret
from the agents in
⋃
i∈J1,qK Li. One can interpret it in terms
of levels of security clearance, where Lq , q ∈ Q, represents a
set of agents that share the same level of security clearance,
and for q′ < q, Lq′ , represents another set of agents with a
higher security clearance than Lq .
Remark 12. We require information-theoretic security across
security clearance levels, meaning that the agents in Lq ,
q ∈ Q, must keep their keys secret from all agents in
(Li)i∈Jq+1,QK, for any communication strategy the latter group
of agents may decide to adopt. Consequently, we discard the
possibility for the agents in (Li)i∈Jq+1,QK and Lq to agree
on participating in a common secret key generation scheme.
Not doing so might imply that the agents in (Li)i∈Jq+1,QK
follow a pre-determined communication strategy, which would
contradict the information-theoretic security requirement.
To extend Sections III and IV to this setting with multiple
clearance levels, we first consider the following auxiliary set-
ting. We consider the setting described in Definitions 1 and 2
when an eavesdropper that observes the public communication
is also in possession of correlated source observations. The
auxiliary setting is presented in Section VI-B. Next, to address
the multiple levels of security constraints, it is sufficient to
apply the results of Section VI-B to each security clearance
level q ∈ Q by considering for the agents in Lq , the DMS
 \left( \begin{array}{ccc}
\widehat{K}_1  \\
\widehat{K}_2\\
\vdots  \\
\widehat{K}_L  \end{array} \right)
Kˆl, q( ) 1≤l≤Lq
1≤q≤Q
X0N
ENC/DEC
Base Station
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level Q
Kl, 1( )1≤l≤L1
Kl, 2( )1≤l≤L2
Kl,Q( )1≤l≤LQ
Public
communication
over a noiseless
authenticated
channel
Kl, 3( )1≤l≤L3
(a) Overview of the Q sets of Agents
K2, q
X2, qNAgent 2
 \left( \begin{array}{ccc}
\widehat{K}_1  \\
\widehat{K}_2\\
\vdots  \\
\widehat{K}_L  \end{array} \right)
K1, q
X1, qNAgent 1
ENC/DEC
KLq, q
XLq, qNAgent Lq
ENC/DEC
X0N
ENC/DEC
Base Station
ENC/DEC Public
communication
over a noiseless
authenticated
channel
Level q
Kˆl, q( )1≤l≤Lq
(b) Representation of the setting at Level q ∈ Q.
Fig. 3. Many-to-one secret-key generation setting with multiple levels of
security clearance. (b) provides details of the setting described in (a) at a
given level q ∈ Q.
(XLq ×X0 ×XLq+1:Q), where Lq+1:Q , ⋃i∈Jq+1,QK Li, with
the assumption that an eavesdropper observes the components
XLq+1:Q of the DMS.
B. Auxiliary setting
Consider a DMS (XL ×X0 ×Z, pXLX0Z), where Z is
an additional, compared to the source model considered
in Section II-A, component of the source observed by an
eavesdropper. The source is assumed to follow the following
Markov chain: for any S, T ⊆ L such that S ∩ T = ∅,
XS −X0 − (XT Z). (66)
We then consider the same Definitions 3, 4 as in Section II-B,
where the secrecy constraint (6) of Definition 4 becomes for
a coalition S ⊂ L
lim
N→∞
I(KS ;ASXNScZ
N ) = 0. (67)
Next, we define our object of study as the secret-key
generation problem we have just defined when S = L and
when the users are selfish. Similar to Section II-C, we wish
to understand whether the agents can find a consensus about
the coalitions to form, and how the secret-sum rate of each
coalition should be allocated among its agents. Following
Section II-C, we cast the problem as a coalitional game
(L, vZ) where the value of coalition S ⊆ L is defined as
the maximal secret-key sum-rate that coalition S can obtain
regardless of the strategies adopted by the member of Sc.
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Similar to the proof of Theorem 1 by using Corollary 5,
stated below, in place of Corollary 2, one can show the
following characterization of the value function vZ .
vZ : 2L → R+,S 7→ I(XS ;X0|XScZ). (68)
Similar to Proposition 1, one can show that the game
(L, vZ) is convex, and similar to Theorem 2 that its core is
given by
C(vZ) =
{
(Rl)l∈L : ∀S ⊆ L,
I(XS ;X0|XScZ) 6
∑
i∈S
Ri 6 I(XS ;X0|Z)
}
.
(69)
Moreover, similar to Proposition 3, the Shapley value is in
C(vZ) and given by
∀l ∈ L, RShapl
= I (Xl;X0|Z)− 1
L
∑
S⊆L\{l}
(
L− 1
|S|
)−1
I (Xl;XS |Z) .
(70)
Finally, it is possible to achieve any point of the core C(vZ)
with an explicit coding scheme, by deducing from Theorem 4
the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Consider a DMS (XL ×X0 ×Z, pXLX0Z) such
that ∀l ∈ L, |Xl|= 2 and the Markov chain (66) holds. Any
rate tuple in
RZS ,{
(Rl)l∈S : 0 6
∑
i∈T
Ri 6 I(XT ;X0|XScZ),∀T ⊆ S
}
(71)
is achievable by the coalition of agents S ⊆ L. Morevover,
C(vZ) ⊂ RZL . (72)
Finally, from Corollary 4, we deduce, similar to the proof
of Corollary 2 the following corollary, which allows us to
establish (68).
Corollary 5. Corollary 4 implies that for any S ⊆ L,
the secret-key sum rate I(XS ;X0|XScZ) is achievable by
Coalition S.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied a pairwise secret-key generation source
model between multiple agents and a base station. Although
cooperation among agents can increase their individual key
length, it can, at the same time, lead to conflict of interests
between agents. We have proposed an integrated information-
theoretic and game-theoretic formulation of the problem.
Specifically, we have cast the problem as a coalitional game
in which the value function is determined under information-
theoretic guarantees, i.e., the value associated with a coalition
is computed with no restrictions on the strategies that the users
outside the coalition could adopt. We have shown that the
game associated with our problem is convex, and characterized
its core, which is interpreted as a converse for our setting.
We have shown that the grand coalition is in the best interest
of all agents and stable, in the sense that any coalition of
agents has a disincentive to leave the grand coalition. We
have also characterized the Shapley value, and used it as a
possible solution concept to ensure fairness among agents.
Finally, we have proposed an explicit coding scheme relying
on polar codes for source coding and hash functions to achieve
any point of the core, including the Shapley value and the
nucleolus.
The framework is general and could be applied to other
security problems involving a tension between cooperation
and self-interest. The challenge is in characterizing a value
function for this framework. For instance, in our setting, being
able to determine the value function in the non-degraded
setting when L > 2 remains an open problem, and is,
unfortunately, at least as difficult as determining the secret-
key capacity for the two-user secret generation model of [16].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Let S ⊆ L. We have
H(XNS |AL)
= H(XNS ASAL\S)−H(AL) (73a)
= H(XNS AL\S)−H(AL) (73b)
= H(XNS ) +H(AL\S |XNS )−H(AL) (73c)
> H(XNS ) +H(AL\S |XNS )− log|AL| (73d)
= H(XNS ) +H(AL\S |XNS )−NH(XL|X0)− o(N) (73e)
= NI(XS ;X0) +H(AL\S |XNS )
−NH(XL\S |X0XS)− o(N), (73f)
where (73b) holds because AS is a function of XNS , (73e)
holds because
log|AL| =
∑
l∈L
log|Al| (74a)
=
∑
l∈L
|HXl|X0X1:l−1 | (74b)
=
∑
l∈L
NH(Xl|X0X1:l−1) + o(N) (74c)
= NH(XL|X0) + o(N), (74d)
where (74c) holds by [26], [58], [59, Theorem 3.5].
We lower-bound the second term in the right-hand side
of (73f) as follows
H(AL\S |XNS )
>
∑
j∈L\S
H(Aj |A1:j−1XNS ) (75a)
>
∑
j∈L\S
H(Aj |XN0 XN1:j−1XNS ) (75b)
=
∑
j∈L\S
H(UNj [HXj |X0X1:j−1 ]|XN0 XN1:j−1XNS ) (75c)
>
∑
j∈L\S
H(UNj [VXj |X0X1:j−1XS ]|XN0 XN1:j−1XNS ) (75d)
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>
∑
j∈L\S
∑
i∈
VXj |X0X1:j−1XS
H((Uj)i|(Uj)i−1XN0 XN1:j−1XNS ) (75e)
>
∑
j∈L\S
∑
i∈
VXj |X0X1:j−1XS
(1− δN ) (75f)
=
∑
j∈L\S
|VXj |X0X1:j−1XS |(1− δN ) (75g)
=
∑
j∈L\S
NH(Xj |X0X1:j−1XS)− o(N) (75h)
=
∑
j∈L\S
NH(Xj |X0XJ1:j−1K∩L\SXS)− o(N) (75i)
= NH(XL\S |X0XS)− o(N), (75j)
where (75a) and (75e) hold by the chain rule and be-
cause conditioning reduces entropy, (75d) holds because
HXj |X0X1:j−1 ⊃ HXj |X0X1:j−1XS ⊃ VXj |X0X1:j−1XS ,
(75f) holds by definition of VXj |X0X1:j−1XS , (75h) holds by
Lemma 2, (75j) holds by the chain rule.
Finally, combining (73f) and (75j) proves Lemma 4.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
We first prove the result when Z = ∅. For XL, X ′L, FL, F ′L
independent, we compute the following collision probability
P[(FL(XL), FL) = (F ′L(X ′L), F ′L)]
= P[FL = F ′L]P[FL(XL) = FL(X ′L)] (76a)
=
∏
l∈L
P[Fl = F ′l ]P[FL(XL) = FL(X ′L)] (76b)
= s−1L
∑
xL,x′L
P[FL(xL) = FL(x′L)]P[XL = xL, X ′L = x′L]
(76c)
= s−1L
∑
xL,x′L
P[FL(xL) = FL(x′L)]P[XL = xL]P[X ′L = x′L]
(76d)
= s−1L
∑
S⊆L
∑
xL
∑
x′L
s.t.x′S 6=xS
x′Sc=xSc
P[FL(xL) = FL(x′L)]
× P[XL = xL]P[X ′L = x′L]
(76e)
= s−1L
∑
S⊆L
∑
xL
∑
x′L
s.t.x′S 6=xS
x′Sc=xSc
∏
l∈L
P[Fl(xl) = Fl(x′l)]P[XL = xL]
× P[X ′S = x′S , X ′Sc = xSc ]
(76f)
6 s−1L
∑
S⊆L
∑
xL
∑
x′L
s.t.x′S 6=xS
x′Sc=xSc
2−rSP[XL = xL]
× P[X ′S = x′S , X ′Sc = xSc ]
(76g)
6 s−1L
∑
S⊆L
∑
xL
2−rSP[XL = xL]P[X ′Sc = xSc ] (76h)
6 s−1L
∑
S⊆L
∑
xL
2−rSP[XL = xL]2−H∞(pXSc ) (76i)
= s−1L
∑
S⊆L
2−rS−H∞(pXSc ), (76j)
where (76g) holds by the two-universality of the Fl’s, l ∈
L, (76h) holds by marginalization over X ′S , (76i) holds by
definition of the min-entropy.
Then, viewing V(pFL(XL),FL , pUKpUF ) as a scalar product
between (pFL(XL),FL − pUKpUF ) and its sign, by Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, we have
V(pFL(XL),FL , pUKpUF )
2
6 sL2rL
∑
mL,fL
[
pFL(XL),FL(mL, fL)−
1
sL2rL
]2
(77a)
= sL2rL
 ∑
mL,fL
pFL(XL),FL(mL, fL)
2
− 1 (77b)
= sL2rLP[(FL(XL), FL) = (F ′L(X ′L), F ′L)]− 1 (77c)
6 2rL
∑
S⊆L
2−rS−H∞(pXSc ) − 1 (77d)
=
∑
S(L
2rSc−H∞(pXSc ) (77e)
=
∑
S⊆L
S6=∅
2rS−H∞(pXS ), (77f)
where (77d) holds by (76j).
We now introduce the random variable Z correlated to XL
and proceed as in [54]. Let z ∈ Z and X(z)L be defined by
p
X
(z)
L
= pXL|Z=z . We have
V(pFL(XL),FL,Z , pUKpUF pZ)
= EZ
[
V(p
FL(X
(z)
L ),FL
, pUKpUF )
]
(78a)
6 EZ
√√√√∑
S⊆L
S6=∅
2rS−H∞(XS |Z=z) (78b)
6
√√√√∑
S⊆L
S6=∅
2rS−H∞(XS |Z), (78c)
where (78b) holds by (77f), (78c) holds by Jensen’s inequality
and since, by definition, EZ [2−H∞(XS |Z=z)] = 2−H∞(XS |Z),
S ⊆ L.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We consider the coding scheme of Section IV-A. The only
difference with the proof of Theorem 3 is that instead of
Lemma 4, we now need to lower bound for any T ⊆ S ,
the quantity H(XNT |XNScAS). We do it as follows.
H(XNT |XNScAS)
= H(XNT X
N
ScAS)−H(XNScAS) (79a)
= H(XNT X
N
ScAS\T )−H(XNScAS) (79b)
= H(XNT |XNSc) +H(AS\T |XNT XNSc)
−H(AS |XNSc). (79c)
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We lower bound H(AS\T |XNT XNSc) in the right hand side
of (79c) as follows.
H(AS\T |XNT XNSc)
> NH(XS\T |X0XTXSc) + o(N) (80a)
= NH(XS\T |X0) + o(N), (80b)
where (80a) holds similarly to (75j) proved in Appendix A by
conditioning on XNSc , (80b) holds by the Markov chain (1). We
then upper bound H(AS |XNSc) in the right hand side of (79c)
as follows.
H(AS |XNSc)
6 log|AS | (81a)
=
∑
i∈S
log|Ai| (81b)
=
∑
i∈S
|HXi|X0X1:i−1 | (81c)
=
∑
i∈S
NH(Xi|X0X1:i−1) + o(N) (81d)
= NH(XS |X0) + o(N) (81e)
= NH(XT |X0) +NH(XS\T |X0) + o(N), (81f)
where (81d) holds by [58, Theorem 3.5], (81e) and (81f) hold
by the Markov chain (1). Hence, we obtain
H(XNT |XNScAS)
> NH(XT |XSc)−NH(XT |X0)− o(N) (82a)
= NI(XT ;X0|XSc)− o(N), (82b)
where (82a) holds by combining (79c), (80b), and (81f), (82b)
holds by the Markov chain (1).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
We first show the following lemma and then use a similar
argument than in [60].
Lemma 6. Let S ⊂ L. The set function w : 2S → R+, T 7→
I(XT ;X0|XSc) is submodular, i.e., −w is supermodular.
Proof. Let U ,V ⊆ S. We have
I(XU∪V ;X0|XSc) + I(XU∩V ;X0|XSc)
= I(XU ;X0|XSc) + I(XV\U ;X0|XScXU )
+ I(XU∩V ;X0|XSc) (83a)
= I(XU ;X0|XSc) +H(XV\U |XScXU )
−H(XV\U |X0XScXU ) + I(XU∩V ;X0|XSc) (83b)
6 I(XU ;X0|XSc) + I(XV\U ;X0|XScXU∩V)
+ I(XU∩V ;X0|XSc) (83c)
= I(XU ;X0|XSc) + I(XV ;X0|XSc), (83d)
where (83c) holds because H(XV\U |XScXU ) 6
H(XV\U |XScXU∩V) and because H(XV\U |X0XScXU ) =
H(XV\U |X0XScXU∩V) by the Markov chain (1). 
For S ⊂ L, (S, w) defines a concave game by submodular-
ity of w shown in Lemma 6. Consequently, its core C(w) ,
{
(Ri)i∈S :
∑
i∈S
Rl = v(S) and
∑
i∈T
Ri 6 v(T ),∀T ⊂ S
}
is
non-empty by [38], i.e., there exists an achievable rate tuple
in RS with sum-rate I(XS ;X0|XSc).
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